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Tuesday, March 22, 2005
Second Guessing AL Starters
I look over the Rotowire Fantasy Baseball Guide closer than most others (except for the Rotoman thing that comes out first but doesn't have enough of Steve Moyer's "Picks and Pans"). We all know how thankless a task these player predictions can be. But I like to second guess as much as the next guy. Is it me or do these seem pitcher values seem especially nutty (AL only, 4X4)? Brad Radke: $30. This type of thing always bugs me. We knew who Radke was last year. He was a firmly established player. Just because he had a career-type season, his projected value shouldn't move this dramatically. I bet he doubled his RW value from last year. I like Radke. But I wouldn't pay more than $20 for him. I can easily see 30+ homers and a 4-plus ERA. Zack Greinke: $27. What? The Royals are so bad that Greinke will be lucky to win 10 games. Plus he give up a lot of homers and the K's aren't there. He says he can throw upper 90s if he wants to. What's he waiting for, an engraved invitation? I stop the bidding at $15 and hope he'll earn $20. Of course, he can easily earn $10. Joel Pineiro: $26. I hate guys who get hurt and then try to heal on their own. I used to do this with my '74 Volvo when I was in college and couldn't afford needed repairs. A lot of wishing with each turn of the key. Plus, Pineiro is too hot and cold to deserve this kind of money. If you like him that much, just trade for him when he's in one of his inevitable ruts. I can't see going over $16-$18. Bobby Madritsch: $19. I think he was a fluke last year. I don't like guys who emerge in their late 20s this much, even if they're lefties. Plus, where was the minor league dominance last year. I would hope to get a guy like him for $10. Otherwise, I'll pass. Jeremy Bonderman: $14. What? Now this is a guy I can see paying mid-20s for. Of course, I'll take him at $14. I love how everyone loves Bonderman but they can't commit enough projection dollars to him to ensure that readers actually do what's needed to acquire him. To me, there's no comparison between Bonderman and Grienke, who RW has being worth about twice as much in 5x5, too. There's also no comparison between Bonderman and the next guy.... David Bush: $14. Here's a guy I pay $10 for. Nice stuff. Nice makeup. Nice No. 3 starter one day. But this bid is trying to get in on the next Roy Halladay and that ain't happenin' here. Freddy Garcia: $14. Talk about no respect. I know the ballpark is tough. But you wouldn't know it by looking at Garcia's splits last year. Garcia out-earns Greinke this year easily and I'll take him over Radke, too. I'd absolutely love him for $20. Kelvim Escobar: $10. We have a winner in our most underrated pitcher award. God I hope and pray this is a consensus view so I can steal him in my home league. Escobar's DIPS were easily top 10 AL last year. Heck, his actuals were pretty damn good, too. But he's tiered with Paul Byrd? Please. (I like Lackey a lot, too, but he's at least listed for $13). END.
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Defense Rests for Yanks
Here's an article I wrote for the New York Sun. It hasn't been published yet. Will it be? Who knows. by Michael Salfino In an effort to secure the World Series crown that has proved so elusive since 2000, the Yankees committed a veritable mountain of money this winter to starting pitching. Of course, the team did the same thing in 2004 but still finished in the middle of the pack in ERA -- a half-run per game worse than the Red Sox and behind the Rangers (whose starters were snickered at all season). If allowing less runs was such an organizational priority, many objective observers wonder why a bigger effort wasn't made to fortify the defense. There is a wide body of statistical analysis that says that the Yankees were a below-average defensive team last year and are likely to be worse in 2005. Of course, this same type of analysis clearly states that Derek Jeter is a below-average defensive shortstop and he was just awarded the Gold Glove. So, what makes statistical measures better than the naked eye? "The impact of plays made/not made can be calculated as a function of balls hit to a given fielder, and his rate at converting them into outs," says Chris Dial of Baseball Think Factory (www.baseballthinkfactory.org).
This type of analysis is preferred by Dial because the older statistical method of predicting runs saved based on a defender's assists and putouts did not account for oddities of chance. For example, Dial notes, the Yankees have generated fewer balls hit to shortstop over Jeter's career than the data would predict. Not accounting for distribution oddities on balls in play can lead to unfairly underrating and overrating defenders.
Dial, who says that Jose Valentin or Bobby Crosby would have been more worthy of the AL Gold Glove for shortstop last year, acknowledges that Jeter performed better defensively in '04 than ever before. Yet Dial still grades Jeter a "D" on a A-through-F grading scale and estimates he'll cost the Yanks about 8-to-10 runs compared to an average defensive shortstop. But Dial admits Jeter's defense is generally underrated by the statistical community.
"I think 'statheads' don't mind seeing a player considered a demigod by the fans and the media come up short, and simply overstate his shortcomings."
An American League scout who asked not to be identified says that Jeter grades out above average defensively despite lacking consistency "because he will flash outstanding range and above average arm when the game is on the line. Don't underestimate Jeter's instincts. Think of that play he made backing up a throw on the first-base line in the playoffs against the A's."
The scout admits those plays are tough to quantify. "Players win Gold Gloves for spectacular plays as opposed to consistency. How many 'web gems' do you get on ESPN?"
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for Economics for his work in examining heuristics and biases that affect our judgment. His "availability bias" seems to directly address ESPN's impact on assessing defense. The more easily we can retrieve a memory, Kahneman proved, the more frequently we believe an event occurred.
"Availability bias hits the nail on the head," Dial says. "(Highlights) shape the perception of players."
Even with a poor assessment of Jeter, Dial grades the Yanks infield defense as a B-minus. Another independent researcher, Tim Grassey, who has set out to create a simple index that will allow fans to accurately assess each player's defensive ability (a project with so many variables that Grassey now wonders if he'll ever finish), thinks the Yanks will be below average everywhere on the infield except third base. Dial even predicts that Alex Rodriguez will be worthy of the Gold Glove at third this year.
Second baseman Tony Womack is a defensive downgrade from Miguel Cairo. The 35-year-old Womack, despite being a converted shortstop, has only average range at the keystone, according to Dial's analysis.
Tino Martinez charts as slightly above average unless you expect those skills to decline at age 37. Still, he's an upgrade over Jason Giambi, who, Dial says, "is not Mike Piazza-bad, but definitely below average."
There is also consensus that the Yanks biggest defensive problems are in the outfield, especially in center, which will be patrolled by 36-year-old Bernie Williams.
Dial gives Bernie Williams a D-minus/F defensively. "He was once a good fielder. But his range and arm are a tremendous liability at this point in his career."
Our scout agrees. "He just doesn't have the legs anymore and what range he has is deteriorating."
Last year, Williams wasn't as much of an issue because Kenny Lofton ably patrolled center for much of the year.
There's a split with LF Hideki Matsui. "He'll cost the Yanks about 8-to-10 runs defensively over the season," says Dial, who grades him as a "D." Our AL scout disagrees, saying that Matsui is "very underrated defensively. He doesn’t have a strong arm but is accurate. If he was in left for my team, I'd feel very comfortable. And I'm not even counting the fact that he's a great hitter."
The scout also likes RF Gary Sheffield more than Dial and Grassey. "He has a tremendously strong arm and average range in right. So I'd grade him above average."
Whether by chance or design, the Yanks have assembled a starting staff that should yield fewer flyballs than average (only Mussina can be called a flyball pitcher, and a slight one at that). Randy Johnson reduces the importance of defense when he pitches due to his prodigious strikeout rates and large percentage of innings he'll likely consume (as much as 15 percent of the team's total, according to Grassey).
Dial notes that the outfield's shortcomings should still be more heavily weighted. "Outfield misplays allow more extra-base hits."
Grassey predicts the Yanks will allow opponents to hit .305 on balls put in play while Dial predicts .306. The league average last year was .302. The difference, according to Dial, will translate to about 20 runs over the course of the season. "Every 10 runs represents a win or loss, so the Yanks defense alone will cost them two wins this season."
Ball distribution is a key to these projections. "The more balls hit to center relative to average, the more the Yanks will be hurt."
Two wins seems like a minor problem. Chinese proverb says it's better to have a diamond with a flaw than a pebble without one. But weaknesses in sports matter most when the competitive differences are slightest. So among the handful of games defense costs the Yanks in '05 could be one that ultimately proves decisive in mid or late October.
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Wednesday, March 09, 2005
The Ed Whitson Myth
Ever since Ed Whitson's brief and inglorious Yankee tenure following his free agent signing 20 seasons ago, he's been cited as the example of the pitcher who just can't cut it in the Bronx. In successive seasons, Yankee fans have dealt with the ghost of Whitson as Jeff Weaver and, most recently, Javier Vazquez utterly failed to live up to expectations that they would quickly rise to the top of the team's starting rotation. In 2005, two high-priced free agent pitchers will try to survive their first season in pinstripes so that they may earn the extended stay in New York that eluded those previously mentioned. Will the Yanks see a reasonable return on their substantial investments in Carl Pavano and Jaret Wright or will they be forced to go back to the drawing board with their rotation next year (if not sooner)?
Despite its shaky logical foundation, you won't find anyone in the Yankee hierarchy question the Whitson myth because it absolves all of them of culpability for mistakes. If a Yankee free agent pitcher doesn't work out, it's not because he was never worthy of the investment or because the coaching staff failed in its mission to ensure that players perform at or near their highest possible levels. These players fail because they're spooked by the beast that is New York. Many in the media foster the myth rather than examine it because they are viewed as the teeth of this beast and it's better to be seen as tough than toothless.
With the exception of his second Yankee season, Whitson's career seems like most other players who manage to last 10 or more years. In ERA, for example, he ranged from 10-to-20 percent below league average to 10-to-20 percent above it. And he fell within this range before during and after his Yankee tenure. According to baseball-reference.com, Whitson's ERA as a ratio to the league ERA (with less than 100 being below average and more than 100 being above) was 89, 114, 85, 125, 81, 84 and 110 before signing with the Yanks. In his first year in the Bronx, Whitson posted an 83, which was well in line with his established performance. Yes, he cratered the following year with a 61 but pitched almost that poorly after his trade back to San Diego (maybe due to that that electrically charged Padres environment). Whitson then followed up with 84, 91, 132, 148 and 75 before retiring.
Weaver's ERA relative to the league in his full season as a Yankee was unlike anything he's seen before or since and Vazquez last performed that poorly as a 22-year-old. Perhaps these two pitchers are better examples of Ed Whitson Disease than is Whitson himself.
Or maybe they were just unlucky. There's a well-regarded school of thought in baseball that once a batter makes contact, fortune and defense determine whether the ball put in play results in a hit or an out. Weaver's hit percentages on balls in play the last five years: 29, 30, 30, 35, 30. Guess which of those numbers came in his full Yankee season. (Remember, these five percentage points turn a .250 batting average allowed to .300.)
Vazquez's percentages the past four years: 29, 31, 29, 28 (Yankees). But he pitched well enough to make the all star team in the first half. So maybe his luck turned (or defense turned sour) after the break. Indeed, his hit percentage climbed from 26 percent in the first half to 31 percent in the second. This alone is not enough to fully explain the decline and ignores the alarming loss of command (K/BB ratio). As injuries have been ruled out by his present and former team as well as by Vazquez himself, this is cause to examine the coaching staff. All Mel Stottlemeyer could come up with (after the fact, apparently) was that Vazquez was "choking his fastball." If that's true, it seems like a relatively minor and easy fix. The only alternative theory is that Vazquez decided that New York was too tough for him sometime after the all star break (despite the Yankees having a playoff spot virtually assured).
Let's go inside the numbers and try to determine what the future holds for Pavano and Wright.
The pitcher most statistically comparable to Pavano, in my opinion, is Charles Nagy, a nice pitcher at his peak but not someone you wanted leading a postseason charge. Pavano's ERA relative the league varies more significantly than did Whitson's two decades ago: 151, 73, 79, 94, 137. If Pavano comes in 10-to-20 percent below league average, it shouldn't shock or be seen as evidence of a lack of character. It's just part of who Pavano is as a player.
Wright is generally viewed as the more questionable signing. In fact, GM Brian Cashman all but conceded that Wright wasn't worth the money and blamed the contract on market forces (which means the Mets and Kris Benson, who will be cited as the cause for every failed winter investment regardless of how he performs). But a reasonable case can be made that Wright deserved about the same ERA in 2003 that he earned in 2004, with the difference being attributed to a ridiculous 37 percent hit rate on balls in play in '03 compared to 30 percent last year.
The player most comparable to Wright from the list provided by baseball-reference.com is Chris Carpenter. As is the case with Carpenter, it's hard to make much sense of Wright's recent history, given his chronic shoulder problems and long road back to major league relevance. The Yankees likely recoup their investment in Wright if he's able to sustain a starter's workload for the next three seasons. If you think the odds against that happening are long, remember that Wright has already beaten longer odds by making it back this far to begin with.
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Both Sides Against Mets Middle
Kaz Matsui spent the majority of his rookie year lost in translation and former phenom Jose Reyes frustrated the front office by limping through the fifth and sixth leg injuries of his nascent career. Much of the Mets offensive success this year will hinge on these difficult-to-project players, who are set to occupy the top two spots in the batting order after swapping middle-infield positions during the off-season. The statistical community seems to have the same collective memory regarding naming shortstop Reyes as a worthy successor to the position's trinity that Van Halen has for naming Gary Cherone lead singer. The venerated Baseball Prospectus went so far as to suggest that shortstop Reyes spend the majority of 2005 honing his skills in Triple A Norfolk after struggling to reach base out of the leadoff spot when healthy last season. Second baseman Matsui's detractors point to his disappointing power and poor 40/97 BB/K ratio, and similarly want to erase prior projections that fashioned Kaz as the Japanese Barry Larkin.
But could Reyes' really be so easily derailed on the road to stardom? And should Matsui's Japanese triumphs be ignored even in light of the success enjoyed by fellow imports Hideki Matsui (no relation) and Ichiro Suzuki?
It's easy to forget that Reyes is sixth months younger than David Wright. While there is some research that indicates that players with a full year of experience in Triple A have a significantly greater chance of succeeding in their rookie season, that doesn't mean that players with major league experience will improve with more time in the minors. Adjusting to better competition is a skill in itself, arguably the most difficult one for major leaguers to master. Performing well against lesser competition, while perhaps psychologically beneficial, seems only to skirt this bigger issue.
And it's not like the Mets have superior middle-infield options in the organization. After all, Reyes was hitting much better just prior to sustaining his stress fracture last season. In 494 career at bats, he sports a .714 on base plus slugging percentage (OPS) while fielding shortstop well above average (according to most accepted defensive metrics). Even more promising was his Dominican League campaign this winter, during which he hit over .300 with 11 steals in 29 regular season games and then .422 with three homers and nine more steals in 15 playoff contests. Most important, he stayed healthy despite failing to complete the off-season training program suggested by renowned leg specialist Mackie Shilstone.
Reyes needs to adjust his swing so that he can revert to the ground ball rate that better complimented his skills 2003 (47 percent of balls put in play vs. 43 percent in 2004 despite a higher rate of bunts). More ground balls will also help Reyes improve his hit percentage once contact is made from 29 percent in 2004 to the 33 percent level he achieved in 2003 (as would, perhaps, some better luck). Reyes does need to at least reverse his declining walk rate (six percent in '03 compared to just two percent in '04). These relatively minor adjustments can be quickly realized and will likely boost his on-base percentage 10-to-15 percent.
Once he's on base, Reyes has the skills to emerge as one of the major's most successful thieves. Reyes was 11-for-11 in stolen bases last July before injuring his leg and picked off where he left off in the Dominican League and now in spring training.
Matsui had to acclimate himself to a new league and new culture last season. This year, he must tackle a new position, which may minimize expected benefits from his improved comfort level during his second season in New York.
Most statheads consider professional baseball in Japan to be the equivalent of a very good AAA league (with arguably better pitching). That means that Matsui's Japanese performance should ultimately translate to an .800 OPS in the majors. If so, when? Well, last year, Matsui posted an .880 OPS in July before succumbing to his bad back.
The key to Matsui improving his power production will be decreasing his tendency to hit ground balls. In fact, swapping their respective ground ball ratios would go a long way toward Matsui and Reyes becoming the players most thought they'd be in 2004.
We don't have groundball statistics from Japan. But given the 69 homers he hit there in 2002 and 2003, it's reasonable to assume that Matsui was not the groundball hitter he was during his major league debut. Note that Hideki Matsui also unexpectedly became a ground ball hitter as a rookie and his power understandably ebbed. Last year, he doubled his fly ball rate, nearly did the same with his home run total (16 to 31) and changed the experts' perception of him from overrated to deserving all-star.
Also boding well for Kaz Matsui is the reduction in his strikeout rate from once every four at bats in the first half of '04 to once every six at bats in the second half (which may not be a representative sample size given the time he missed with injury). If that holds, it would mean about 40 more balls put in play during the season and, given Matsui's percentages last year, about 13 more hits (which turns the .272 Matsui hit last year to .296, given 500 at bats).
So what should we expect in 2005 from the top of the Mets lineup? Let's give Reyes a batting-average heavy .320 on-base percentage, good enough to warrant the leadoff spot if his hamstrings can sustain 50 stolen base attempts with the 85-to-90 percent success rate he's more than capable of posting. Give Kaz Matsui a high .700, low .800 OPS with enough fly balls to surpass those low-double digit HR projections. Like Reyes, Matsui proved last year to be an efficient base stealer, which increases the overall offensive value of the top of the Mets order beyond what their OPS suggests.
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Friday, March 04, 2005
Spring Slush
It's been said that spring is when you feel like whistling even with a shoe full of slush. And given their respective winter spending sprees, the Mets and Yanks do seem to have reason to chirp. For wary Mets fans, however, the team's purported bullpen woes are the cold splash of reality that rudely interrupts these October dreams. Non-biased Yankee observers see the combination of a thin bench and age as the major obstacle on the path to the World Series crown that has proved so elusive since 2000. New Mets GM Omar Minaya had the right idea in attacking the bullpen with a wide array of low-cost options, resisting the urge to land bigger names at the cost of payroll flexibility and/or valuable commodities like the team's handful of intriguing minor leaguers. Recently, Mike Cameron was rumored to be trade bait for Detroit's former closer, Uggie Urbina, who was sub-par last year away from the pitching haven that is Comerica Park.
So what are the prospects for the Mets' pen leading up to closer Brandon Looper?
Mike DeJean wasn't nearly as bad for Baltimore as he was unlucky with batting average allowed on balls hit in play. His earlier control struggles seemed completely rectified before he broke his leg. DeJean will be an adequate set-up man if he allows less than one homer per nine innings, likely considering he's done that three of the last four years (just two HRs in 61 innings in '04).
The primary lefty looks to be Japanese import Dae-Sung Koo. Though his peripheral numbers in Japan are not impressive (especially those 24 homers allowed in 116-plus innings), it's important to note they were compiled as a starter. When starters move to the bullpen, their strikeout rates tend to spike significantly. For example, Eric Gagne averaged seven strikeouts per nine innings as a starter and over 12 as a reliever. Significant strikeout improvement also has been experienced by pitchers ranging from Tom Gordon to Scott Schoeneweis. Koo averaged almost eight Ks per nine innings as a Japanese starter in 2004. Given that San Diego's Akinori Otsuka's Japanese strikeouts translated reasonably well last year and White Sox closer Shingo Takatsu dramatically improved on all of his peripheral Japanese relief numbers in the AL's toughest pitching park, expect Koo to average more than a K per inning between long balls.
The most likely of the remaining candidates to travel north is righty Scott Strickland, who has a good chance of picking up where he left off nearly two years removed from Tommy John surgery.
Most savvy Mets fans are hoping that Felix Heredia struggles so badly this spring that the team is forced to invest in arms with more upside. But a second lefty will be required if Heredia is released and the only other roster options at the moment are Mike Matthews and Scott Stewart, who were both painfully ineffective in 2004. Before resorting to a trade, the Mets should audition minor leaguer Blake McGinley, who was long in the tooth for AA and AAA last year but continued to excel in the Venezuelan League (20/4 K/BBs in 14 relief innings).
Keeping retreads Roberto Hernandez or (gasp) Todd Van Poppel would come at the expense of potential power arms Heath Bell, Bart Fortunato, Orber Moreno (shoulder permitting) and even Aaron Heilman. Remember that Heilman has averaged seven strikeouts per nine innings in about 100 frames as a big league starter and could boost that to double digits as a reliever if the Mets have the imagination to facilitate such a move.
Yankees fans will all eventually scratch their heads over how a $200 million payroll investment could yield arguably the league's worst bench. Rey Sanchez backs up at three positions and one of those spots is manned by Tony Womack, who should be a backup himself. The fourth outfielder, Ruben Sierra, can't adequately defend and the purported defensive center fielder, Doug Glanville, doesn't flash enough leather to justify late-inning lineup machinations (which is probably exactly the way Joe Torre wanted it). If utility man Damian Rolls makes the cut, he'll combine with Sanchez and backup catcher John Flaherty to give the Yanks three bench players not good enough for the Devil Rays.
Granted, a bench isn't as important in the AL as in the NL. But the Yankees are alarmingly old and it's not reasonable to expect such a geriatric crew to avoid injury or steep performance declines. Look at the Baseball Prospectus/PECOTA projected on base plus slugging percentages for Tino Martinez (.794) and Womack (.656) and at bats for Jason Giambi (307) and Bernie Williams (447).
Expect GM Brian Cashman to attempt the same mid-season overhaul in 2004 that occurred in 2000, when the bench was completely churned and replaced with Glenallen Hill (16 HRs in 132 Yankee ABs), David Justice (who started but allowed DH Shane Spencer to slide to the bench), Luis Sojo (who continued his career year after the trade), Jose Vizcaino (need we remind Mets fans of his World Series importance) and Luis Polonia.
The only player on the current roster who could trigger an in-season shakeup is well-regarded second base prospect Robinson Cano (216 at bats above AA), who PECOTA projects better than Womack. Cano's ascension would allow Womack to slide into a super utility role that would include significant innings in centerfield and late-inning speed similar to what Dave Roberts provided to such great effect for the 2004 Red Sox. However, the Yankees reportedly have already shopped Cano and he's just as likely to be bench bait than quarry.
The Yankees are in a much better position to address their primary need in-season than are the Mets, as they can count on getting someone else's overpaid regulars for a summer song. Options here are likely to be plentiful, given the Yanks relative financial clout. The Mets, meanwhile, will be in a line of suitors targeting a non-contender's middle reliever with a bargain salary. Prospects will be required; and given how the Mets overpaid at the deadline last year, the mere fact that the team has a new GM isn't going to stop every front office in baseball from trying to extract top dollar.
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